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FOR IM,IEDIATE RELEASE
SOAMES STRESSES POLITICAL CONTEXT OF
IRADE
WASHINGTON, DC -- April 6, L973 -- The EC Connnissionrs I'overall vief'on the
scheduled world trade talks in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATI) is being studied by the EC Council of Itlinisters in Brussels.
The Corrnission formally agreed to transmit its position paper on the GATT talks
to the Council on April 4. On the same day, Conrnission Vice President
Christopher Soames, responsible for the ECrs external relations, informed
the European Parliament of the Conrnission's thinking on the GATT talks.
Excerpts fron his remarks to the Parliament in Luxembourg fol1ow:
I'Tite House [European Parlianent] will recal1 that at the Paris Sunnit
conference last October the Comnunityts institutions were asked to formulate
by July 1 their roverall vierr' on the forthconing m:lti1atera1 trade negotia-
tions in GATT. The paper rtre are sending to the C,overnments is the Conrnissionfs
contribution to that overall view.
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"Now in all our reflections on tlfs rnatter there is one thing I am
convinced that we must never forget. Vrre sha1l of course be negotiating
about very concrete economic issues. There will of course be veste: interests
involved on all sides. There will of course be dornestic political difficul-
ties within each of our countries. And the results of the negotiations will
be of great significance in themselves. Previous GATT negotiations on trade
liberalizatioit have had considerable beneficial effects on world trade
expansion. Indeed it is this, acconrpanied by a notable economic expansion
within the Corrnunity, which has provided the basis for its high and compara-
tively stable leve1 of employment arxi tire notable rise in the standard of
living in recent years. But this is not the only importance we should attach
to these negotiations. They have a political sigrificance that goes far
beyond the material issues actually to be discussed round the negotiating
tab1e.
The Politicq] Irnportance of Trade
rwe must bear in mind that trade is one of the few matters on which at
present the Corrnrnity can, and indeed must, speak with a single voice. And
it is therefore through negotiations of this character that the Conrnrnity can
develop its personality and make its political impact and contribution to world
affairs. We must appreciate, therefore, the political importance r.vliich all
our partners will attach to these negotiations, inasmuch as they provide
them with one of their rare opporflmities to engage the Conrnunity as a who1e.
I am sure this is particularly true of the Llnited States, which sees these
negotiations as part of an funportant relationship in which trade has its place
but in which many other wider potitical considerations are equally irrvolved.
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"The subjects on which we shal1 be negotiating will be technical, intricate,
often intractable in character. There is no doubt in rny inind they will be
very tough negotiations. They will require all the skill our trading experts
can muster. But the strategy of these negotiations must not be confounded
with their tactics. Tlrey mrst on no accorxlt be allowed to nrn into the sands
of technicality. That is why I hope that mernbers of Parliament, and the
representatives of the me,nber states in the Council of Ministers, will give
these technical matters their fuIl attention. For they are bung-fu11 of
political content and will need positive overall political control. That
control must not merely make certain that our policies in the economic domain
are compatible with the political purposes which we and our major partners
have in cormon, but also that the developing-cog:rtries of tne world would
stand to gain from what we do.
'TIow in fact do we see the world context of these negotiations? We in
the Corrunission believe that the moment is ripe for a major step forward in the
freeing of world lrade and that we should rnake the most of the opportunity.
We believe that the Connnrnity has a great deal to contribute and that it also
has a great deal to gain.
'We have recently been living through the rnost profound disturbance in
the worldrs monetary system since World War II. But that does not in ally way
diminish the need to liberalize world trade.
'rBut it must be clearly stated tlrat the large-scale international benefits
which we hope will flow frorn these negotiations would be seriously jeopardized
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if ways are not for.rnd to shield the world economy from monetary shocks and
irnbalances such as have occurred in the last few months. The Coimnrnity
must make its contribution to the necessary monetary measures involved.
To Liberalize Trade and Help "Third &r1d"
"In the trade negotiations, r{re believe that the Comrnrnity should have
two paranount aims. Between the industrialized cotmtries v,Ie mrst consolidate
and contirrue the process of liberalization, and do so on a reciprocal basis
to our mutual advantage. For the less-developed world, we must ensure not
simply that their interests are not damaged, but, on the contrary, that they
secure greater opportunities for their economic expansion as a result of what
we do. Without detriment to the advantages enjoyed by those countries with
whom our Conrmrnity has special links, new opportunities must be given to
developing countries to increase their trade.
"Let me now come to our more detailed suggestions for the overall view
of these negotiations. They will involve, among other things, discussions
on tariffs, on non-tariff barriers, on agriculture, on what we can do to
help the developing world, and on safeguard clauses. Let me take each of
these topics in turn.
"I do not suppose that we shall reach a world without tariffs in these
comiag negotiations, nor do we think that the time is ripe to try to do so.
But I do hope we shaIl achieve a significant further lowering of tariffs-
What we need is a forrmrla for lowering tariffs on industrial products -- a
sinple formula and one that can be generally applied. We now have big
differences between the tariff systems of industtialtzed countries. Some
have a fairly even tariff that does not vary too much from product to
product. other countries have a tariff barrier that looks more like a craggy
mountain range, with very high duties on some goods and very 1ow duties on
others.
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"I think what we have to do is this: We shoul-d settle on a broad princi-
ple that the higher the tariff, the greater the reduction in it for which we
should aim. For the very low tariffs we can set a threshold, so that they
dontt have to come doun any further. That way, we will help to reduce the
problem of reciprocity with some of our trading partners in the future.
Non-Tariff Barriers
"Non-tariff barriers are clearly going to pLay a very inportant role in
these negotiations. But they are so disparate in character, so complex and
so inchoate, that simple overall formulae will be impossible to find. So we
should. be selective in our strategy here. GATI and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development have already made various studies. We
can pinpoint some individual non-tariff barriers in different countries
where changes can yield substantial benefits to trade. We should agree to
pick out some of the main fields where we can get rid of a complex of non-
tariff bariers, or at least regulate thern by codes of good conduct.
Certainly we can draw up a list of the main non-tariff barriers applied
against us by our trading partners that ule want to see disappear. But to
make the negotiations credible, we will also irave to prepare a list of our
own non-tariff barriers that we ourselves are prepared to tlrrow into the
pot in return, to negotiate away or at least to adapt.
"For the most part, these barriers are not imposed by the Connnunity.
They are imposed by our individual member states. lVe rmrst look to the nember
states to work together with the Corirnission to draw up a list of them which
is substantial enough to set against, in a spirit of reciprocity, that we
will be seeking to obtain from our partners. Under no illusion that it will
be easy to calculate reciprocity here, the best we can do is to aim at a
package deal that is fair overall.
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Agriculture
0f course the negotiations on agriculture will be different in character
frorn those on tariffs and non-tariff barriers on trade in industrial
goods. We have to take account of the special characteristics of
agriculture. Both the Cournunity and our main trading partners
each apply support policies of one kind or another for the benefit
of their own farmers. lrle have to take account, too, of the instability of
world markets. The Conrmission believes that our overall objective must be
to negotiate measures on a reciprocal basis to permit the regular expansion
of agricultural trade. We sha1I resist arty attack on the principles of the
conrnon agricultural policy, but we must equally be prepared to apply the
instrr.rnents of that policy in such a way that our broad objective of expand-
ing agricultural trade in the world can be achieved. We will be suggesting
that in the negotiations we should consider drawing up with our partners a
code of good conduct on agricultural export practices. We sha1l also
propose that international arrangements should be considered for certain
conmodities.
Developing Countrigs
ilNext I come to our contribution to improving the trade opportiffrities
for developing countries. We have given a great deal of thought to this
question. It will not have escaped the House that the lowering of tariffs
between industrialized countries, even though extended to the developing
cotmtries on a most-favored-nation basis, does very little to he1p. On
the contrary, the lower the most-favored-nation tariffs are, the less use
is the generalized preference scheme to the developing world. The lower
the tariff, the less does exemption from it he1p. To some extent, of course,
developing countries will benefit from any expansion of world trade. But we
do not intend to Iet matters rest there.
-7-
',First of all, it is essential that all developed corurtries should now
apply general-ized preference schemes. The Conrnunity has done so. We are
greatly encourage<1 to hear that in the forthconing trade bill our American
fri.enrls now intend to incorporate provisions to introduce a generalized
preference scheme of their oun. We for our part believe that the best way
to help developing cogntries would be for us and others to extend
generalized preference schemes. tr\le would like to see them cover a greater
ru.unber of transformed agricultural products. We would also like to see
an increase in the quantitative ceilings on certain sensitive products.
We should also make special efforts to take account of the interests of
developing countries when we consider non-tariff barriers and when we
consider agricultural trade. We might think in terms of food aid conuniunents
when we are considering how to regulate agricultural markets.
Safegualds
"The last detailed point to mention is the vexed question of safeguards
when domestic producers are gravely threatened by the results of trade
liberllization. .We believe that the provisions of Article XIX of the GATT
should be maintained as they are. But this article has not proved easy to
apply effectively in the past. Perhaps we should extend its provisions so
that we can apply safeguard measures selectively rather than right across
the board against all our suppliers. But in that case we should wish to
agree with our partners on Very stringent criteria. We rnay need more
flexible safeguard procedures, but we must remember the danger that too many
over-lax safeguard procedures could come in time to jeopardize confidence
in the world-wide liberalization of trade.
,,That is the main content of the paper which ltle are now sending to the
Ministers, md it was in broadly these terms that I outlined it to the Cotrncil
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yesterd.ay. It does not set out to be a draft mandate for the negoti-ations or
to be exhaustive. Nor for that matter does it represent some sort of response
or riposte to the preparations which our partners in these negotiations are
at the moment naking themselves. None of that would seem at this stage either
necessary or wise. What we are trying to do is to dr:aw attention to the main
problens and help the Conrm-rnity as a whole to prepare a Q'ollStructive overall
approach to what we hope will prove an economically fruitful and a politically
constructi-ve negotiation.
